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Christopher J. Davis, Ph.D., University of South Florida – St Petersburg, USA
Eileen Z. Taylor, Ph.D., North Carolina State University, USA

ABSTRACT
Risk management is critical to the success of contemporary firms and while new technologies
present opportunities for innovation and growth, they present new risks. Risk management of
information systems and technology (IS/IT), is particularly critical because firms in almost all
sectors of the economy are so dependent on it. We explore firms’ response to IS/IT risk
management by analyzing their SEC-mandated regulation S-K risk disclosures. We find a lower
than expected incidence of risk disclosures related to IS/IT and surmise that this result may be
symptomatic of tension between firms’ need to comply and their need to appear to comply with the
regulation, while at the same time presenting data that are valid, but which do not jeopardize
potential investment. We explore three propositions related to IS/IT risk disclosures and discuss
implications for research and practice.
Keywords: Enterprise Risk; Risk Management; IS/IT; S-K Risk Disclosures

INTRODUCTION

R

isk and reward in the development and use of information systems and technology (IS/IT) are both
high. As IS/IT become ubiquitous, more powerful, and less costly, both business and society generally
become increasingly dependent upon them. Rapid innovation in IS/IT combined with falling costs
affect the potential risk and reward. Lower costs prompt more aggressive investments in newer technologies. Lower
costs also affect perceptions of risk: no longer are functionally sophisticated IS/IT the exclusive possessions of
corporate giants. Newer technologies like social networking, server and process virtualization, and cloud computing,
present opportunities for rapid innovation. They also come with new, sometimes unrealized risks.
This presents a significant challenge to those charged with managing risk and rewards. Accounting practice
has evolved to finesse the processes and metrics used to manage reward: however, the field of risk management is
less mature. At the enterprise level, risk management primarily involves the identification and evaluation of risks to
the business. Emerging enterprise risk management (ERM) strategies facilitate intervention to mitigate and prevent
risks.
In this study, we investigate the effect of the SEC’s Regulation S-K on risk disclosures made by pubic
firms, and discuss how the disclosure process influences the greater area of risk management. We offer three
propositions that address those effects and use empirical data to test them. Our focus is on IS/IT, as it provides the
physical and logical infrastructure for more and more sectors of the economy, and thus we can reliably expect that
all firms face risks in this area. Our analysis reveals that over 40% of Fortune 100 firms reported no IS/IT risks in
either of the two years that risk disclosure was voluntary or in the first year that it was mandated by Regulation S-K.
Additionally, nearly half of the industries represented in our sample had no firms list even one IS/IT risk factor. We
contend that these findings are incongruous with industry reports and research indicating much greater IS/IT risk
exposure facing organizations (e.g., Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Hines, 2007; Hodge, 2007; Romney & Steinbart, 2009;
Kieke, 2006).
Our paper proceeds as follows. First, we outline prior research into enterprise risk management,
information systems governance, and Regulation S-K. From this review, we develop our propositions and set out
our research design. Subsequent sections present our results and provide commentary on our findings, observations,
and opportunities for future research.
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/
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ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT AND TODAY’S IS/IT RISKS
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) comprises a multi-step process of risk identification, evaluation,
mitigation, and reporting. The aim of the process is to call attention to areas where management might intervene or
institute additional oversight to ameliorate risk and prevent future losses; however, firms do not always recognize or
realize the benefits of ERM. Beasley et al. (2009) reports that 62% of 700 for-profit, not-for-profit, and
governmental entities surveyed indicate that (although) the volume and complexity of risks had increased
substantially in the last five years, “…not all organizations are modifying their procedures for identifying, assessing,
managing and communicating risk information to key stakeholders”. Also lacking is the development of a new
organizational mindset that recognizes the wide variety of risks present in business. While some risks may be
adequately addressed (i.e., market and credit risks for banks), there is a “real danger” that other types of risks are
ignored (Maurer, 2009, 13). Critical to the success of contemporary business, information systems present
challenges to risk management that have attracted attention both within the development and user communities and
among regulators.
Contemporary firms are so dependent on IS/IT that those systems have become ‘mission critical’.
Increasingly rich electronic media support increasingly complex interactions and exchanges within and between
firms. Today IS/IT support complex and continually evolving business processes: every facet of the firm from
purchasing to accounting, production, sales, distribution, and logistics all depend on the efficient and effective
operation of IS/IT. Growing dependence on the World Wide Web and web 2.0 capabilities such as server
virtualization and cloud computing have further increased the complexity of both the processes and the technologies
that support them (Sherer & Alter, 2004). Clearly, as business processes become increasingly interdependent and
information intense, the risks associated with their failure or other interruption of services increase in complexity
and volume. Regulatory compliance is also highly dependent on the proper functioning of IS/IT. Studies show that
IS/IT is the most complex and costly to document in Sarbanes-Oxley compliance efforts, and that it should be
considered a “high risk” area (Bryan, 2009, 34). The identification, assessment, and communication of risk is
recognized as the core of effective IS/IT governance (O'Leary, 2000; Hunton et al., 2004; Cavusoglu et al., 2004).
Catastrophic business failures such as Enron raised awareness of the risks surrounding IS/IT: inadequate controls
have been cited as a significant risk factor (Solomon, 2005; Bryan, 2009). Such risks have been recognized by the
U.S. government: in May 2009, President Obama created the role of cyber security czar to protect the nation’s
digital infrastructure (Simpson & Cole, 2009). Highly publicized data theft incidents, as experienced by companies
such as TJX and Heartland Payment Systems, have served to intensify the spotlight on IS/IT risk exposure
(Acohido, 2009; SecurityFocus, 2007).
REGULATION S-K AND PROPOSITION 1
Regulation S-K was one result of the SEC’s intention to alert investors to the wide-ranging risks of
purchasing and owning a company’s stock. Enacted in 2002, the regulation requires that companies disclose the
most significant factors that may adversely affect the issuer’s business, operations, industry, financial position, or its
future financial performance (Oppenheimer et al., 2005). In the financial services sector, the SEC has (since 1997)
required firms to disclose information about market risk exposures from financial instruments (Securities and
Exchange Commission, 1997). However, the corporate accounting scandals and business gyrations of the early
2000’s show clearly that firms face a multitude of other risks: many of these arise from the dependence of business
processes on IS/IT. Regulation S-K mandates the communication of an organization’s broad risk exposure, and
applies to all public companies. It seems likely that firms who were not engaging in effective risk management prior
to the regulation may begin to implement and improve their risk management programs in response to the
regulation.
Because IS/IT are mission critical, one might expect firms to identify and disclose myriad IS/IT related
risks. However, we have identified four factors from prior research that may adversely affect comprehensive
identification and disclosure.
•
•
2

Firms may inadequately identify IS/IT risks
Firms may not appreciate the interconnectivity and synergy of IS/IT risks
http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ © 2012 The Clute Institute
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Firms may not see any benefit in disclosing those risks (and may in fact see negative outcomes)
Firms may view Regulation S-K not as a mandate to perform ERM, but merely as a burdensome
compliance task, influenced by myriad legal and other pressures.

We posit that the first factor, inadequate identification of IS/IT risks, arises due to the absence of consistent
and coherent guidance on risk identification. Despite their substance and widespread adoption, IT governance
frameworks such as COBIT, ITIL and ISO/IEC 17799 do not specifically provide guidance for assessing or
addressing intra- or inter-organizational concerns and risks associated with the complex business processes
supported by IS/IT (Sutton et al. 2008). ITIL provides guidance on best practices for IT service management;
COBIT is primarily a high-level governance and control framework, and ISO/IEC17799 provides a framework for
information security management. Their emphasis of events and other circumstances internal to the firm limit their
capacity to accommodate the more emergent risk factors and the inter- and intra-organizational dependence on IS/IT
that generate them.
Relatedly, uneventful business operations may lull management into a false sense of security when it comes
to their systems, leading them to underestimate and operate unaware of the critical risks they face. Prior research
shows that user communities and management tend to take IS/IT for granted. Sophisticated and successful
operational use leads to an unrealized and largely underestimated dependence on IS/IT (Kieke, 2006). The risks
associated with their failure do not take center stage when they are working smoothly. We surmise that
organizations may be operating under a false sense of security whereby mission criticality is masked by the
uneventful normal operation of IS/IT. Dependence is so complete that IS/IT becomes part of the undiscussed social
routine, until the wheels come off.
The second factor, failure to fully appreciate the variety and synergistic potential of the IS/IT risks that are
identified, is highlighted by Dehning et al. (2005), who cautions against the narrow conceptualization of IS/IT risks,
primarily because these risk factors are difficult if not impossible to measure directly. If management bases its
decisions on a narrow and consequently rather naïve assessment of specific individual factors, the cumulative and
consequential effects of such risks can be missed (op cit, 1004), giving rise to and perpetuating a vicious circle:
underestimation leading to underreporting of risks.
The third factor takes a cost/benefit approach and presumes that firms will not see any good coming from
disclosing these risks. Zimmerman (1987, 131) observes “…despite the apparent unanimity of interest in and high
value placed on risk communication, considerable disagreement occurs with respect to its goals or purpose.”
Certainly, if managers are aware of the risks, it may be difficult to see the benefit of sharing these Achilles’ heels
with the public. They may overlook the goodwill generated among investors should these disclosures demonstrate a
commitment to transparency to the public. Managers may see only costs and negativity should they disclose these
risks. They may fear that investors will view their firms not as open and honest, but as an unsafe investment – one
burdened with risk. Outcomes arising from disclosure of IS/IT risks include negative market reaction or
overreaction, display of weakness to competitors, and broadcasting of security weaknesses to potential hackers
(Suijs, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2005; Securities and Exchange Commission, 2011)
The last factor that may impede firms from implementing a comprehensive risk program is that they view
the regulation as a compliance issue, rather than as an opportunity to enhance their business. This view focuses on
satisfying the SEC by coming with a list of plausible, generic risk factors that ostensibly meet the requirements of
the regulation. A surface-only approach ignores the true value that firms can gain from a complete ERM
implementation; however, given limited resources, is one they might well choose.
Thus, while we expect that the regulation will lead to improvements in the identification and disclosure of
IS/IT risks, several factors may counter this expectation. At the same time, the nearly complete dependence of
contemporary business on IS/IT, the ever increasing media coverage of IS/IT failures, and the requirements of
Regulation S-K should demand that organizations pay attention to IS/IT risks. Accordingly, our first proposition is
as follows:

© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/
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Pervasive dependence on IS/IT will increase the volume of IS/IT risks identified, and thus disclosed in
response to regulation S-K.

TRUST SERVICES FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSITION 2
As noted earlier, dependence on IS/IT goes unnoticed, as long as all is working smoothly. By requiring
firms to identify and disclose risks, Regulation S-K may provide the impetus for a thorough review of these systems.
Several comprehensive governance frameworks are available to guide managers in conducting IS/IT risk
assessments.
The Trust Services Framework (TSF), developed jointly by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), provides a robust typology of
risks. TSF comprises a set of core principles and criteria that directly address the reliability of a firm’s information
technology and systems (AICPA & CICA, 2006). TSF provides a means to accommodate and categorize risk
disclosures from firms and industries throughout the economy. The five fundamental TSF principles are security,
availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy. Security is the foundational principal of the
framework on which the other four depend (Romney & Steinbart, 2012). These five principals characterize controls
and policies designed to identify and attenuate risk to both IS/IT operations and development processes. Availability
refers to the accessibility of the system for processing, monitoring, and maintenance; processing integrity addresses
the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of system processing; confidentiality refers to the protection of
confidential firm information, and privacy focuses on the protection of information a firm holds regarding its
customers, suppliers, and employees. Together, the five principles contribute to the ultimate goal of achieving
systems integrity and minimizing systems risk exposures (AICPA & CICA, 2006). The professional guidance for
identifying and addressing risks provided by TSF (Coe, 2005) makes it a strong candidate for firms to use when
assessing their IS/IT risks. Thus, although other frameworks are available, TSF offers a robust yet parsimonious tool
for our analysis.
The existence of these (and other frameworks) provides a blueprint for managers to use when faced with
identifying risks and developing risk disclosures. Regulation S-K motivates firms to seek out and implement these
frameworks; the comprehensiveness of these frameworks increases the likelihood that management will identify a
larger and more varied set of risk factors.
P2

Regulations requiring the identification and disclosure of risk factors increase firms’ awareness of the
variety of IS/IT-related risk factors facing them.

Today, few firms are immune to IS/IT risks. In the past, only certain limited sectors were high-risk (e.g.
medicine, defense, and the airlines); now, IS/IT dependence is critical to the success of the majority of sectors in the
economy (Cavusoglu et al., 2004). The proliferation of IS/IT has been particularly significant in the financial
services sector (Zhu et al., 2004). As noted previously, this sector has been subject to risk disclosure regulation since
1997, and thus, it is reasonable to expect that some level of risk awareness and management is present. Research
indicates, however, that sixty to 90% of all firms have experienced a major control failure or IS/IT security breach
(Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Romney & Steinbart, 2009; Kieke, 2006; Hines, 2007). This reality dictates that most all
firms have some IS/IT risk exposure, which may or may not have been recognized before the failure.
Clearly, there are variations both within and between industry sectors. Amazon.com is more dependent on
IS/IT than more traditional bricks and mortar retailers, and farming less so than telecommunications. Nevertheless,
the apparently inexorable rise of e-commerce, whether business-to-business or business-to-consumer, inevitably
gives rise to a growing range of IS/IT risks for all industry sectors. IS/IT have become mission critical for a
significant proportion of businesses in all sectors of the economy. Regulation S-K applies to all industry sectors and
may, therefore, motivate firms to identify IS/IT risks not previously considered. Our third proposition addresses this
expectation:
P3
4

Regulations requiring the identification and disclosure of risk factors increase the awareness of IS/IT risks
by firms across all industry sectors.
http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ © 2012 The Clute Institute
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METHOD
In order to test our propositions we evaluated the nature and scope of IS/IT risks disclosed in response to
the S-K mandate. We first identified IS/IT-related risks and their position (relative to other risks) within firms’
annual reports. We then classified the identified and ranked risks into the five substantive categories included in the
Trust Services Framework (TSF). In the third and final step, we used industry codes to explore the relationship
between IS/IT-risk disclosure and industry sector as a means to test our last proposition.
ANALYTICAL APPROACH
We identified the Fortune 100 firms (ranked according to total sales) for the year 2004 (listed in Appendix
A) and collected relevant data from the Compustat database. We excluded five mutual insurance firms since they
are not publicly traded: the first phase of our analysis began with an initial pool of 95 firms. We analyzed the
records of these 95 firms over the three years 2004-2006. Various mergers further reduced our initial data set from
95 firms to 93 in 2005 and 92 in 2006 (the first full year of implementation). For this analysis, the 280 10-K reports
were used to gather industry code and text of item 1a (the location of the risk factor disclosures required by
Regulation S-K).
We categorized the textual data in two stages. First, we isolated IS/IT-related disclosures, then, we
classified them using the principles embodied in the TSF (the coding scheme used is presented in Appendix B).
Inter-rater agreement for the first phase was 97.2% and 87.3% for the second. Inter-rater reliability was Kappa =
0.941, a very high level of agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977). Differences between coders were resolved through
review and discussion between them and an independent expert in information systems.
We then calculated the average position of the IS/IT-related disclosures relative to non-IS/IT-related
disclosures. This aspect of our analytic approach was a response to the substantial challenges of developing
measurement models for risk assessment identified by Debreceny (2006) and others. Clear distinction between
levels of risk has intuitive appeal as highlighted by a study of the COBIT framework (Debreceny, 2006). Regulation
S-K makes no mention of degree or importance of risks, nor does it require firms to specifically rate or rank risks.
Thus, it provides no definitive method of judging the level of each risk relative to other risks. We compensated for
this limitation by using the position (rank) of each classified disclosure in relation to others in Item 1a of the 10-K
report: positional data such as rank provide a reasonable surrogate indicator of significance.
RESULTS
We identified 3,795 individual risk factors from the 280 documents analyzed. In 2004, only 68% of firms
in the data set (65/95) reported one or more risk factors. This proportion rose to 100% in 2005 and continued at this
level through 2006. During this period, the average number of risk factors per firm per year increased slightly, from
13.28 in 2004 to 16.27 in 2006, as did the maximum number of risks per firm, from 41 to 48. Table 1 illustrates
these trends.

2004
2005
2006

Number of risk
factors
863
1435
1497

Table 1
Total Risk Factors by Year
Number of firms reporting
Mean number of
at least one risk factor
risks per firm
65
13.28
93
15.43
92
16.27

© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/

Standard Deviation

Range

8.67
8.23
8.55

1-41
1-42
1-48
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Frequency of Total Risk Factors

# of Companies

60
50
40
30
20
10
0

1-10

11-20

21-30

31-48

Number of Total Risk Factors per Company

2004

2005

2006

Figure 1

Figure 1 presents a frequency distribution of these data. Although the upward trend is evident from the
visible steps in the 11-20 and 21-30 ranges, we noted the very modest increase in the number of registrants reporting
higher numbers of risk factors over time.
Proposition 1: Pervasive dependence on IS/IT will increase the volume of IS/IT risks identified, and thus disclosed
in response to Regulation S-K
The global data for all risk factors summarized above show that all firms reported at least one risk by the
first full year of S-K implementation. However, the disclosure of IS/IT-related risks was relatively low. Only 18
firms reported one or more IS/IT risk factor in 2004, 47 in 2005, and 55 in 2006: Table 2, Panel A provides an
overview of this trend. The steady increase in the total number of risk factors reported (Table 1) seems mirrored here
by an increase in the number of firms reporting at least one IS/IT risk factor. In 2004 (the year before the mandate),
only 27.6% of Fortune 100 Regulation S-K eligible firms reporting risk factors reported any IS/IT risk factors. The
proportion increased to 50.5% in 2005, and 59.8% in 2006. Nevertheless, we were surprised by the absence of any
IS/IT risk factor disclosure from over 40% of the largest firms filing under Regulation S-K in 2006 (the first full
year of the regulation).
Table 2, Panel B presents the result of our analysis of the relation between the number and percentage of
IS/IT-related disclosures to all risk disclosures. Although the number of risk disclosures overall increased, those
related to IS/IT represented a relatively small proportion (3.6% of all risks disclosed over the three year period).
This proportion has remained relatively static, increasing from 2.1% of the total number of risk factors disclosed in
2004 to 3.6% in 2005 and 4.4% in 2006.
These proportions are inconsistent with the dependencies and risks outlined in the introduction and the
centrality of risk identification, assessment, and communication to management and governance of IS/IT. Our
analysis shows that the proportion of IS/IT risk factor disclosure has increased: however, this increase is from such a
very low initial threshold that is impossible to reconcile the increase with prior research into IS/IT risks and failure
(Charette, 2005), which suggests large increases in IS/IT risk over the same period.
Table 2, Panel B extends this analysis to summarize the positional (ranking) data we used as a proxy
indicator of the significance of the risks disclosed: the average rank of non-IS/IT risks factors is 10.5, the average
rank for IS/IT risk factors is 13.0. This analysis suggests that IS/IT risks appeared consistently later in the risk
disclosures, indicating that management considered them less significant than other risks. Once again, this seems
counter-intuitive in the context of prior research and experience of IS/IT failures.
6
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Based on the low incidence of reported IS/IT risks, and their later appearance in risk disclosures, and in
light of only slight increases in the number of IS/IT risk factors disclosed, Regulation S-K has not appeared to
improve identification and disclosure of IS/IT risk factors. We do not find support for P1.

Year
2004
2005
2006

Table 2
Prevalence of IS/IT Risk Disclosures
Panel A
Number of firms reporting at
Total number of firms reporting
least one IS/IT risk
at least one risk factor
18
65
47
93
55
92

%age of firms reporting at
least one IS/IT risk
27.6%
50.5%
59.8%

Panel B
Average rank a

18
845
863

%age of total
risks
2.1
97.9
100

2005
2005
2005

51
1384
1435

3.6
96.4
100

12.4
10.4

IS/IT Risks
Non-IS/IT Risks
Total

2006
2006
2006

66
1431
1497

4.4
95.6
100

13.1
10.9

IS/IT Risks
Non-IS/IT Risks
Total

Total
Total
Total

135
3660
3795

3.6
96.4
100

13.0
10.5

Year

Number of individual risks

IS/IT Risks
Non-IS/IT Risks
Total

2004
2004
2004

IS/IT Risks
Non-IS/IT Risks
Total

14.4
10.0

Proposition 2: Regulations requiring the identification and disclosure of risk factors increase firms’ awareness of
the variety of IS/IT-related risk factors facing them.
This proposition addresses the distribution of IS/IT risks among the various risk areas. As noted earlier,
several frameworks exist to assist firms in assessing IS/IT risks. COBIT, for example, derives 215 specific control
objectives from 34 high-level IS/IT processes, which provides a comprehensive, yet highly detailed blueprint. TSF
provides five general categories of IS/IT risks, which, given the content and number of risk factors in our
population, provided a parsimonious, yet sufficient tool for our analysis.
Recall that the five fundamental principles TSF includes are security, availability, processing integrity,
confidentiality, and privacy. TSF is a comprehensive instrument: guidelines for its use require that all five principles
are a pre-requisite for systems reliability; yet, experts agree that entirely eliminating the risks accommodated by TSF
is impossible (Romney & Steinbart, 2009). A benefit of TSF’s comprehensive nature is that it can accommodate any
and all risks identified. A drawback of this is that the classifications in our coding schema (Appendix A) are not
mutually exclusive: an individual risk factor could relate to more than one principle (e.g. the risk of system failure
could relate to processing integrity and availability). Consequently, we include some risks in more than one
category.
The summary presented in Table 3 shows that issues relating to system availability represent a significant
proportion of the IS/IT-risks disclosed, 29.7% of the total number of risk factors classified (232). Security was the
next most significant factor according to this classification with 61 disclosures (26.2%), followed by processing
integrity issues (25.8%), threats to confidentiality (9.5%) and privacy (8.6%).

© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/
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Table 3
IS/IT Risk Factor Categorization based on Trust Services Framework
# of factors (maximum of each type per firm)
Totals IS/IT
Processing
Disclosures/Categories
Availability
Security
Integrity
Confidentiality
18
11 (1)
7 (1)
9 (1)
1 (1)
47
30 (2)
26 (2)
27 (2)
9 (1)
55
28 (2)
28 (2)
24 (3)
12 (2)
120/232(100%)*
69(30%)
61(26%)
60(26%)
22(9%)

Privacy
2 (1)
9 (2)
9 (1)
20(9%)

Distribution of IS/IT Risk Factors Among
Trust Services Principles
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

2004
2005
2006

Trust Services Principle
Figure 2

Changes in the distribution of these risk factors over time (Figure 2) show that disclosure of confidentiality
and privacy risks increased as a percentage of total IS/IT risk factor disclosures over the three-year period. 1 This
trend indicates an increase in corporate awareness of these two types of IS/IT risks, providing support for our
proposition that the regulation has improved understanding of the variety of risks facing firms. There appears to be
some rebalancing of IS/IT risks reported.
Proposition 3: Regulations requiring the identification and disclosure of risk factors increase the awareness of
IS/IT risks by firms across all industry sectors.
In the third phase of our analysis, we reviewed variations between industries to test our proposition about
the frequency and proportion of IS/IT risks disclosed. Our expectation was that firms in industries with greater
reliance on and pervasiveness of IS/IT would report greater numbers (and/or a greater proportion) of IS/IT risks than
firms in industries with less reliance on IS/IT. Table 4 lists the specific industries in which at least one firm reported
IS/IT risks as at least 10% of their total risks reported (2004-2006). Of the 56 industries in our data set, only six
industries surpassed this threshold. Table 4 shows these six industries in descending order of the percentage of total
risk factors that are IS/IT-related: finance (25%), radio, TV, and electrical stores (25%), department stores (13.3%),
hospital and medical service plans (12.4%), general medical and surgical hospitals (11%), and plastics (1%).
1

None of the major privacy regulations was enacted during the period we examined. The Financial Modernization Act was
implemented in 1999 and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act was first enacted in 1996 and revised in 2003.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act was finalized in 2008. This act protects the privacy of student educational
records, and does not affect the companies in our pool.

8
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Some of our findings appear to support P3. Finance firms and hospital and medical service plans, whose
operational processes depend heavily on IS and are closely regulated, made the top of the list. Some retail stores
(radio, TV, electrical and department) which depend on IS/IT to support operational processes central to revenue
generation, purchasing, record keeping, and distribution also reported greater numbers and percentages of IS/IT
risks. We expect regulation and dependence makes IS/IT risks ‘present’ in the minds of managers and thus makes
identification and disclosure more likely.
However, the finding that 50 industries out of the 56 analyzed (some 89%) list fewer than 10% of their
risks as IS/IT-related was surprising. Telecommunications, insurance, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, and computers
(including software) were included in the ‘less than 10%’ category. While we acknowledge that firms in these
industries might be well placed to mitigate some IS/IT risks through avoidance or sharing, and that these firms may
face myriad other risks, the proportion of IS/IT risks to total risks was surprising and at odds both with our
proposition and the expectations that arise from prior research and experience.
Further, we are at a loss to explain why 27 industries (48%) had no firms list even a single IS/IT risk. These
industries include computer programming and data processing (106), public warehousing (86), guided missiles and
space vehicles (51), television broadcasting (50), and meatpacking (43) – figures in parentheses show the total
number of risk factors disclosed in Item 1a for 2004-2006. While the variations in the level of IS/IT dependence
between industry sectors should affect the volume of risks identified and disclosed, our analysis reveals a rather
alarming lack of consistency that merits further investigation.

NAICS
423430
523110
334111
336322
517110
522291
444110
452111
523110
622110
3252
443112
515210
325412
492110
311930
445110
522320
424210
452990
524114
446110
324110
3341
511210
524113
33611
524126
334220
334119

Table 4
Average Risk Rank for Disclosed IS/IT Risks, by General Industry Groupings (NAICS)
Industry Description
Average IS Risk Rank
COMPUTERS & SOFTWARE-WHSL
4.33
COMMERCIAL BANKS
4.50
ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS
5.33
MOTOR VEHICLE PART,ACCESSORY
6.00
PHONE COMM EX RADIOTELEPHONE
6.00
FINANCE-SERVICES
6.00
LUMBER & OTH BLDG MATL-RETL
7.00
DEPARTMENT STORES
7.50
SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS
8.00
GEN MED & SURGICAL HOSPITALS
8.83
PLASTIC MATL,SYNTHETIC RESIN
9.00
RADIO,TV,CONS ELECTR STORES
9.00
CABLE AND OTHER PAY TV SVCS
9.50
PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS
9.86
AIR COURIER SERVICES
10.00
BEVERAGES
10.40
GROCERY STORES
10.67
FINANCE-SERVICES
12.00
DRUGS AND PROPRIETARY-WHSL
12.38
VARIETY STORES
13.75
HOSPITAL & MEDICAL SVC PLANS
16.09
DRUG & PROPRIETARY STORES
16.50
PETROLEUM REFINING
18.00
COMPUTER & OFFICE EQUIPMENT
18.33
PREPACKAGED SOFTWARE
20.00
LIFE INSURANCE
20.50
MOTOR VEHICLES & CAR BODIES
23.00
FIRE, MARINE, CASUALTY INS
23.17
RADIO,TV BROADCAST, COMM EQ
29.67
COMPUTER COMMUNICATION EQUIP
30.00
Overall Average
12.84
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In a supplemental analysis, (see Table 5) we summarized variations between industry groupings using
positional (rank) data as a surrogate indicator of significance to provided additional insight into industry differences.
Lower values (towards the top of the table) indicate risks that appear earlier in the risk disclosure. For example,
computer and software wholesalers list IS/IT risks earlier in the disclosure, while computer communication
equipment retailers list those risks later.
This phase of our analysis shows that the relative significance of risk disclosures varies between industry
sectors: however, we discern no consistent pattern. Support for our proposition is equivocal.
Table 5
Specific Industries with Firms Disclosing IS/IT Risks Greater than 10% of Total Risks
Total of 2004, 2005, and 2006
Non-IS/IT
Total risks
%age of total risks
IS/IT risks
Industry
risks
(c)
that are IS/IT (a/c)
(a)
(b)
FINANCE-SERVICES
12
36
48
25.0%
RADIO, TV, CONS ELECTR STORES
6
18
24
25.0%
DEPARTMENT STORES
2
13
15
13.3%
HOSPITAL & MEDICAL SVC PLANS
11
78
89
12.4%
GEN MED & SURGICAL HOSPITALS
6
48
54
11.1%
PLASTIC MATL, SYNTHETIC RESIN
2
17
19
10.5%

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
The SEC designed Regulation S-K to improve risk communication by firms to investors and other external
stakeholders. A necessary precursor to this communication is the identification and evaluation of risks by firm
managers and accountants. Our results lead us to question whether the regulation provides a means to demonstrate
visible compliance rather than effective risk management – a nod to communication, without full evaluation or
intervention. Consequently, we question the value of Regulation S-K to stakeholders. Are managers implementing
effective enterprise risk management procedures and communicating the results to the public, or is Regulation S-K
an exercise in compliance?
Our first proposition states that pervasive dependence on IS/IT and high levels of regulation will increase
the volume of IS/IT risks identified, and thus disclosed in response to regulation S-K. Given what we know about
IS/IT risks facing firms in the current technological environment, we expected to observe a number of IS/IT-related
risk disclosures within firms’ annual reports, in response to Regulation S-K. We observed that over 40% of Fortune
100 firms reported no IS/IT risks in either of the two years that risk disclosure was voluntary, and more telling, that
this percentage held in the first full year that that the regulation was mandated. Regardless of the diligence of
managers and IS/IT professionals, no system can be made 100% secure, leaving some IS/IT risk exposure
unavoidable (Bodin, Gordon, & Loeb, 2008). Granted, as discussed earlier, firms may indeed have implemented
effective risk management programs, yet have chosen to keep their findings private, thus preventing us from
observing results. However, if this is the case, Regulation S-K has not accomplished its mission of improving the
flow of information to investors and other external stakeholders.
Our second proposition states that regulations which require the identification and disclosure of risk factors
increase firms’ awareness of the variety of IS/IT-related risk factors facing them. We tested this proposition by
exploring the variation in the types of IS/IT risks disclosed. Using the five TSF principles as a classification system,
we found that two areas, confidentiality and privacy, were increasing as a proportion of total IS/IT risks reported
over time. This observation supports increased awareness of these two areas. We did observe declines in the
proportion of risks related to availability, security, and processing integrity, however, because the absolute number
of IS/IT risks increased, increased awareness of the other two areas did not come at a cost to these three areas.
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Our analysis of the variation in IS/IT risks finds that threats to availability of systems are reported most
often. Since so many business processes rely on IS/IT, availability is critical. In IS/IT-dependent business sectors
such as financial services and healthcare, unavailable systems prevent revenue from being earned and/or collected,
payroll from being processed, bills from being paid, and a host of other activities from continuing. Compared with
the other threats, we perceive system availability to be the most significant and prior research (Meall 2009) supports
this perception. However, despite the clear prevalence of these risks in our analysis, we believe that they are still
significantly under-represented. Two factors prompt this observation. First, the rate of change in the number of these
risk factors over time (see Table 2) suggests persistent under-reporting. Second, we find it difficult to comprehend
how managers within industries that are ostensibly “risk free” in regards to IS/IT according to their disclosures –
including computer programming and data processing, and guided missiles - are failing to acknowledge their
dependence on IS/IT to support mission critical business processes. This issue is addressed in our third proposition,
that Regulation S-K will increase IS/IT risk disclosure across industries.
We cannot support the assumption that firms believe they have mitigated the risk: a recent study found that
69% of business leaders indicate that threats to IS continuity represent a clear and present danger (Hodge 2007).We
conclude that the risks themselves have been insufficiently analyzed in-house and are therefore under-appreciated,
evidenced by the low rate of reporting. This observation concurs with Benaroch et al. (2006) who found that
managers in a financial services setting relied on intuition to assess IS/IT investment risk rather than on any formal
method or framework.
One explanation for the scarcity of IS/IT risk factor disclosures is that Regulation S-K serves the needs of
representation before those of intervention. In other words, firms are merely complying with a directive, rather than
embracing a new process (enterprise risk management). Firms enact compliance with Regulation S-K by aligning
their actions with those of firms in their own or a similar industry (Miller and O’Leary 2007), meeting the technical
requirements of their regulators, or addressing the demands of their market.
Such behavior gives rise to conceptualization of regulations as what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call an
‘iron cage’. Regulation promotes institutionalization and bureaucratization, which becomes a powerful means of
controlling individuals, to such an extent that it acts as a cage rather than a rationalist organizing framework or form
(Weber 1952). Individual thought becomes imprisoned in the need to ‘box-check’, audit reports default to
standardized formats, and firms rigidly conform to rituals prescribed by the state, professions, and competition
(Power 2009; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Our findings provide some evidence that disclosures made in response to
Regulation S-K reflect regulatory compliance more so than a holistic risk management strategy.
We have examined the effects of Regulation S-K on IS/IT-related risk disclosures, and in doing so add to
our understanding of its strengths and limitations. The strength of regulatory uniformity arises from codification and
systematization – the presentation of order. The weakness is the tendency for users of the regulation to conform
rather than inform – that is to say, to comply with the minutiae of the regulation, rather than use the regulatory
framework as a guide to investigate, explore, and expand the representation to accommodate known and emerging
risks. The uniformity and codification of S-K and other regulatory instruments become an ends rather than a means
to an end. In this situation, regulatory instruments can act like cages rather than frameworks.
This may be symptomatic of tension between the need to comply and the need to appear to comply with the
regulation, while at the same time presenting data that are valid, but which do not jeopardize potential investment.
What is clear from the disclosure practices we report is that the effectiveness of the S-K regulation is open
to question. The objective of the regulation is to provide information to investors and other external parties
regarding the risk exposure of a firm. The archival data used to test our propositions cast doubt on whether firms are
truly informing: identifying risks, exploring their causes and effects, putting in place processes and strategies to
mitigate them, and advising regulators and investors of their actions - or are merely conforming: disclosing the
minimum required to comply with Regulation S-K. If, as Power (2009) observes, risk management is less about
managing risk and more about gaining institutionalized legitimacy, should we not expect the same from risk
management disclosure?
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/
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Future research should explore the connections (or lack thereof) between firms’ established enterprise risk
management processes and their S-K risk disclosures. Questions may include, ‘who creates and approves the risk
disclosure?’ and ‘how much does the disclosure change from year-to-year in response to new risks identified or old
risks mitigated?’ Behavioral analyses using interviews and surveys would be appropriately rich methodologies for
these explorations.
Further research might adopt a ‘user’ or consumer perspective, asking investors whether they read risk
disclosures, and if they do how those disclosures influence their investing decisions. If investors are not using risk
disclosures, is it due to lack of awareness that they exist, lack of trust in their veracity, or a lack of useful
information provided? For example, if there is no differentiation in risk factor disclosures among competing
investments (firms), then the value-relevance of the disclosure for investment decisions is nil. To answer questions
about the variety of risk disclosures will require extensive analysis, but should prove fruitful.
Further research might also explore the value of risk disclosures ‘post-event.’ In other words, does the
disclosure of specific risk factors lessen legal liability in shareholder lawsuits?
Overall, research that addresses the effectiveness of Regulation S-K is clearly worthwhile and timely.
Results and conclusions would, we anticipate, highlight a rather naïve sense of security in the published disclosures
and inform the SEC and government regulators about the efficacy and value of this regulation, and may provide the
impetus to managers to take a closer look at risk management within their firms.
Finally, we suggest that our study demonstrates the potential and wider applicability of the notion of
mediating (Miller and O’Leary, 2007) or, perhaps, ‘remediating’ instruments. Such a perspective provides a warning
to risk managers that mimicking peers may leave you exposed to unidentified risks: it is unrealistic to rely on others
to disclose or even to identify risks. It also reiterates the mutual dependence of representation and intervention,
raising questions that prompt even deeper review of regulations and their effectiveness - did the SEC intend for this
outcome? Do significant and serious risks remain unidentified or undisclosed – and can we tell? Does the current
risk disclosure process help the firm and the investing public?
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APPENDIX A
Listing of Firms Studied – 2005 Fortune 100 (based on 2004 reports)
34 Dow Chemical
67
Sprint
Albertson's (sold to Supervalu
2
Exxon
35 on June 2, 2006)3
68
New York Life Insurance1
3
General Motors
36 Morgan Stanley
69
Viacom
4
Ford
37 MetLife
70
International Paper
5
GE
38 Walgreen
71
Johnson Controls
6
Chevron
39 United Technologies
72
Tyson Foods
7
ConocoPhillips
40 United Health Group
73
Caremark
8
Citigroup
41 Microsoft
74
JC Penney
9
AIG
42 United Parcel Service
75
Honeywell
10
Intl. Business Machines
43 Lowe's
76
Ingram Micro
11
Hewlett-Packard
44 Archer Daniels Midland
77
Best Buy
12
Berkshire Hathaway
45 Sears Roebuck
78
FedEx
13
Home Depot
46 Safeway
79
Alcoa
14
Verizon
47 Lockheed Martin
80
HCA
15
McKesson
48 Medco Health Solutions
81
TIAA-CREF1
16
Cardinal Health
49 Motorola
82
Sunoco
17
Altria
50 Intel
83
Mass Mutual Life1
18
Bank of America
51 Allstate
84
Merck
19
State Farm Insurance1
52 Wells Fargo
85
St. Paul Travelers
20
JP Morgan Chase
53 Merrill Lynch
86
Duke Energy
21
Kroger
54 Walt Disney
87
BellSouth
22
Valero Energy
55 CVS
88
Hartford Financial
AT&T (merged with #33 SBC
23
AmerisourceBergen
56 to form AT&T Inc)
89
Weyerhaeuser
MCI (merged with Verizon, last
24
Pfizer
57 Caterpillar
90
filing 12/29/04)2
25
Boeing
58 Northrop Grumman
91
Cisco
26
Procter & Gamble
59 Goldman Sachs
92
Coca-Cola
27
Target
60 Sysco
93
Bristol-Myers Squibb
28
Dell
61 PepsiCo
94
Lehman Brothers
29
Costco Wholesale
62 American Express
95
Electronic Data Systems
30
Johnson & Johnson
63 Delphi
96
Plains All American Pipeline
31
Marathon Oil
64 Prudential Financial
97
WellPoint
32
Time Warner
65 Wachovia
98
News Corp
SBC Communications (Merged
33
with AT&T in 11/05)2
66 DuPont
99
Nationwide Insurance1
100
Abbott Laboratories
1
Dropped from original pool (insurance firms)
2
Merged or failed in 2005
3
Merged in 2006
1

Wal-Mart
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APPENDIX B
Security
Availability
Processing
Integrity
Confidentiality
Privacy

16

AICPA Trust Services Principles description used to classify Risk Disclosures
The system is protected against unauthorized access (both physical and logical).
The system is available for operation and use as committed or agreed.
System processing is complete, accurate, timely, and authorized.
Information designated as confidential is protected as committed or agreed.
Personal information is collected, used, retained, disclosed, and destroyed in conformity with the
commitments in the entity’s privacy notice and with criteria set forth in generally accepted privacy
principles issued by the AICPA and CICA.
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APPENDIX C
Principle

Security

Availability

Processing
Integrity

Confidentiality

Privacy

Examples of Risk Disclosures categorized by Trust Services Principles
Risk Disclosure Example
If we are unable to protect our information systems against data corruption, cyber-based attacks or
network security breaches, our operations could be disrupted.
We are increasingly dependent on information technology networks and systems, including the Internet, to
process, transmit and store electronic information. In particular, we depend on our information technology
infrastructure for digital marketing activities and electronic communications among our locations around
the world and between Company personnel and our bottlers, other customers and suppliers. Security
breaches of this infrastructure can create system disruptions, shutdowns or unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. If we are unable to prevent such breaches, our operations could be disrupted or
we may suffer financial damage or loss because of lost or misappropriated information.
Infrastructure failures could harm our business. We depend on our information technology and
manufacturing infrastructure to achieve our business objectives. If a problem, such as a computer virus,
intentional disruption by a third party, natural disaster, manufacturing failure, or telephone system failure
impairs our infrastructure, we may be unable to book or process orders, manufacture, and ship in a timely
manner or otherwise carry on our business. An infrastructure disruption could cause us to lose customers
and revenue and could require us to incur significant expense to eliminate these problems and address
related security concerns. The harm to our business could be even greater if it occurs during a period of
disproportionately heavy demand.
We outsource and obtain certain information technology systems or other services from independent third
parties, and also delegate selected functions to independent practice associations and specialty service
providers; portions of our operations are subject to their performance.
Although we take steps to monitor and regulate the performance of independent third parties who provide
services to us or to whom we delegate selected functions, these arrangements may make our operations
vulnerable if those third parties fail to satisfy their obligations to us, whether because of our failure to
adequately monitor and regulate their performance, or changes in their own financial condition or other
matters outside our control. In recent years, certain third parties to whom we delegated selected functions,
such as independent practice associations and specialty services providers, have experienced financial
difficulties, including bankruptcy, which may subject us to increased costs and potential network
disruptions, and in some cases cause us to incur duplicative claims expense.
Certain legislative authorities have in recent periods also discussed or proposed legislation that would
restrict outsourcing and, if enacted, could materially increase our costs. We also could become overly
dependent on key vendors, which could cause us to lose core competencies if not properly monitored.
The success of our business depends on maintaining a well-secured pharmacy operation and technology
infrastructure.
We are dependent on our infrastructure, including our information systems, for many aspects of our
business operations. A fundamental requirement for our business is the secure storage and transmission of
personal health information and other confidential data. Our business and operations may be harmed if we
do not maintain our business processes and information systems, and the integrity of our confidential
information. Although we have developed systems and processes that are designed to protect information
against security breaches, failure to protect such information or mitigate any such breaches may adversely
affect our operations. Malfunctions in our business processes, breaches of our information systems or the
failure to maintain effective and up-to-date information systems could disrupt our business operations,
result in customer and member disputes, damage our reputation, expose us to risk of loss or litigation,
result in regulatory violations, increase administrative expenses or lead to other adverse consequences.
An increase in account data breaches and fraudulent activity using our cards could lead to reputational
damage to our brand and could reduce the use and acceptance of our charge and credit cards.
We and other third parties store Card member account information in connection with our charge and
credit cards. Criminals are using increasingly sophisticated methods to capture various types of
information relating to Card members’ accounts, including Membership Rewards accounts, to engage in
illegal activities such as fraud and identity theft. As outsourcing and specialization become a more
acceptable way of doing business in the payments industry, there are more third parties involved in
processing transactions using our cards. If data breaches or fraud levels involving our cards were to rise, it
could lead to regulatory intervention (such as mandatory card reissuance) and reputational and financial
damage to our brand, which could reduce the use and acceptance of our cards, and have a material adverse
impact on our business.
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